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Evidence
John E. Hall, Jr.
W. Scott Henwood
Leesa Guarnotta
I. INTRODUCTION
The 2020 Coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic brought with it many
firsts, including a year-long moratorium on civil and criminal jury trials.
As of June 2021, many counties across the state expected continued stays
of civil jury trials. Nevertheless, Georgia’s appellate courts continued to
develop Georgia’s evidence laws in the eighth year since the
implementation of Georgia’s new Evidence Code.1 This Article discusses
the developing evolution of the new Georgia Evidence Code, Official Code
of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.) Title 24, by addressing developments of
Georgia’s evidence rules from the period of June 1, 2020, through May
31, 2021.2 Specifically, this Article addresses: (1) exceptions to the rule
against hearsay; (2) rejections of the former Evidence Code; and (3)
continued adoption of federal interpretations.
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II. POSSIBLE EXPANSION OF HEARSAY OBJECTIONS
Other firsts developed in response to the COVID-19 pandemic include
the development of COVID-19 vaccines, the expansive use of Emergency
Use Authorizations in preventing and mitigating the spread of COVID19, and the particularity of certain personal protective devices. These
firsts are likely to lead to litigation or otherwise serve as issues critical
in the defense of COVID-19 liability cases. Accordingly, information
contained on the label of such products and how to admit such
information into evidence becomes important. The Court of Appeals of
Georgia left the question of admissibility of product labels open in the
case of Childers v. State.3
Childers arose out of a 2019 police operation to inspect retail
establishments’ compliance with laws preventing the sale of vape
products to underaged individuals. Specifically, Childers, the clerk at
OLE 5 Vapor, sold products containing nicotine salt to two underage
operatives without asking for proof of age, resulting in her furnishing a
vapor product to a minor pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 16-12-171(a)(1)(A).4
During Childers’s bench trial, the judge admitted into evidence a photo
of the bottle’s label identifying the contents as “nicotine salt” over
Childers’s motion in limine. The trial court stated that the photo was
admissible under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803,5 with reference to a specific
hearsay exception. Childers was convicted and sentenced to twelve
months of probation.6
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Georgia first endeavored to
determine which hearsay exception would permit admission of the
photo.7 The court determined that the admission was pursuant to
subsection 17, market reports and commercial publications, based on the
trial court’s reference to a decision in another case. 8 In Ledford v. State,9
which was decided under the old Evidence Code, 10 evidence of a spray
paint can’s label was inadmissible under a hearsay exception, 11 despite

3. 358 Ga. App. 568, 855 S.E.2d 766 (2021).
4. O.C.G.A. § 16-12-171(a)(1)(A).
5. O.C.G.A. § 24-8-803 (2021).
6. Childers, 358 Ga. App. at 570, 855 S.E.2d at 768.
7. Id.
8. Id. at 570–71, 855 S.E.2d at 768–69.
9. 239 Ga. App. 237, 520 S.E.2d 255 (1999).
10. Childers, 358 Ga. App. at 571, 855 S.E.2d. at 769. The old evidence code did not
include the “market reports and commercial publications” hearsay exception.
11. Ledford, 239 Ga. App. at 241, 520 S.E.2d at 229.
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the dissent’s argument for admission under the “necessity” exception and
reference to label exceptions from other exemptions.12
Next, the court of appeals in Childers acknowledged that “[w]hether
the label on the container of a vapor product comes within an exception
to the general rule against hearsay is a matter of first impression in
Georgia.”13 However, the court declined to rule on the priority of the
admission.14 Instead, the court upheld Childers’s conviction based on
independent testimony, stating only that any error in admitting the label
was harmless.15
Although not a conclusive ruling, Childers and Ledford, along with the
new Evidence Code’s admission of the “market reports and commercial
publications,” created a strong argument for admissibility of labels as an
exception under O.C.G.A § 24-8-803(17).
III. OBJECTIONS: USE THEM OR LOSE THEM
“Raise it or waive it” is a phrase often first introduced to attorneys in
their first-year civil procedure class. But what if you already have a
motion in limine excluding specific evidence from your trial, does that
satisfy the “raise it” requirement? The Supreme Court of Georgia
addressed this question in Williams v. Harvey.16
Williams arose out of a collision leading to Williams’s traumatic brain
injury, onset of seizures, and multiple fractures. Prior to trial, the parties
filed several motions in limine, including Defendants’ motion to exclude
“[s]tatements, contentions, arguments, inferences, or proffer of any
evidence to elicit sympathy for the Plaintiff or any individual.” Although
the trial court reserved ruling on this motion, it stated that “any
statements, arguments, or evidence offered predominantly to overly
inflame the emotions of the jury or to [e]licit excessive or undue
sympathy, hostility, or prejudice for or against either party is
prohibited.”17
During closing arguments, both parties renewed their opening
arguments’ suggested verdict values. The plaintiff claimed $3.4 million

12. Id. at 244–45, 520 S.E.2d at 231 (Pope, P.J., dissenting).
13. Childers, 358 Ga. App at 572, 855 S.E.2d at 770.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 576, S.E.2d 772–73. In addressing the sufficiency of the evidence, the court
did not require chemical testing nor expert opinion by comparison to open container cases
and narcotic cases. Id. See also, Moore v. State, 354 Ga. App. 145, 154, 840 S.E.2d 519, 528
(2020); Ayiteyfio v. State, 308 Ga. App. 286, 289, 707 S.E.2d 186, 188 (2011); Yates v. State,
263 Ga. App. 29, 30, 587 S.E.2d 180, 181–82 (2003).
16. 311 Ga. 439, 858 S.E.2d 479 (2021).
17. Id. at 439–442, 858 S.E.2d at 482–484.
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in special damages and $20 million for pain and suffering, and the
defense countered with special damages being between $4.1 million and
$5.1 million and for pain and suffering between $1.5 million to $2.5
million. Following an $18 million verdict, the defense moved for a new
trial, arguing inter alia that plaintiff’s closing argument violated the
golden rule as prohibited by the trial court’s earlier order. The trial court
denied the motion and found no violation of the golden rule. 18
The Court of Appeals of Georgia disagreed and reversed the judgment,
characterizing plaintiff’s comparison of a nursing home life care plan
option to a “death warrant[,]” as a clear violation of the trial court’s
order.19 The court of appeals relied on case law under the old evidence
code to hold that motions in limine preserve issues for appeal even
without contemporaneous objections.20
The Supreme Court of Georgia granted certiorari to determine
whether a ruling on a motion in limine is sufficient to preserve appeal
despite the absence of contemporaneous objections. 21 To answer this
question, the court turned to the Advisory Committee’s Note on the 2000
amendments to Federal Rules of Evidence 103(b) which states:
Even where the court’s ruling is definitive, nothing in the amendment
prohibits the court from revisiting its decision when the evidence is to
be offered. If the court changes its initial ruling, or if the opposing
party violates the terms of the initial ruling, objection must be made
when the evidence is offered to preserve the claim of error for appeal.
The error, if any, in such a situation occurs only when the evidence is
offered and admitted.22

The court held that Georgia’s adoption of the new Evidence Code,
patterned after the federal rules and guided by federal interpretation,
abrogated prior Georgia law that did not require contemporaneous
objection to preserve errors ruling for a violation of a motion in limine.23
Accordingly, the defense was required to object contemporaneously
regardless of the ruling on its motion in limine.24 The court added that
requiring contemporaneous objection:

18. Id. at 440–441, 858 S.E.2d at 483.
19. Id. at 442, 858 S.E.2d at 484.
20. Id. (citing Cent. of Ga. Ry. Co. v. Swindle, 260 Ga. 685, 687, 398 S.E.2d 365, 367
(1990)).
21. Id. at 439, 858 S.E.2d at 482.
22. Id. at 444, 858 S.E.2d at 485 (alterations in original) (quoting FED. R. EVID. 103(b)
Advisory Committee’s Note to the 2000 amendments).
23. Id. at 445, 858 S.E.2d at 486.
24. See id. at 447, 858 S.E.2d at 487.
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[Allows the trial court] to take remedial action, including providing
curative instructions to the jury and admonishing counsel for the
violation if necessary . . . . [which] is preferable and far more efficient
than the alternative, in which the aggrieved party can sit back and
make no objection in the hope of either a successful verdict or, in the
event of a loss, persuading the trial court or the appellate court to
reverse much later in a motion for new trial or on appeal.25

Additionally, the court refused to extend the meaning of “objection
made” to pretrial rulings on motions in limine.26 The court also refused
to extend appellate review for plain error beyond death penalty criminal
cases.27 Regardless of its decision on contemporaneous objections, the
court stated that the underlying motion in limine was too vague to be
enforceable.28
Interestingly, approximately one year after its decision in Harvey v.
Williams,29 and yet prior to the Supreme Court of Georgia’s decision in
Williams, the Court of Appeals of Georgia had also held that failures to
make contemporaneous objections to violations of motions in limine did
not preserve issues for appeal.30 In Kennison v. Mayfield, following a
collision resulting in Keith Mayfield’s death, the trial court granted
Kennison’s motions in limine to exclude references to her driving record,
prior collisions, and prior traffic offenses. Nevertheless, during
Kennison’s cross examination, the plaintiff raised Kennison’s traffic
citations, suspension of her driver’s license, and arrest for driving under
the influence of alcohol. The defense objected to some of the questions on
grounds of improper character evidence, relevance, and extrinsic
evidence. However, the defense did not object to questions on arrests or
suspensions of license.31
The Court of Appeals of Georgia stated that because the defense did
not raise the objections, it did not preserve those issues for appeal. 32 But
what if, even in the absence of both a motion in limine and a
contemporaneous objection, the trial court exercises its gate keeping
function to preclude otherwise inadmissible evidence? The Georgia Court

25. Id. (internal citations omitted).
26. Id. at 447–448, 858 S.E.2d at 487.
27. Id. In its reasoning, the court acknowledged that it has extended this rule to civil
cases in limited circumstances before but stated that it is now overruling these cases. Id.
at 451, 858 S.E.2d at 490.
28. Id. at 452–453, 858 S.E.2d at 491.
29. 354 Ga. App. 766, 841 S.E.2d 386 (2020).
30. Kennison v. Mayfield, 359 Ga. App. 52, 60, 856 S.E.2d 738, 745 (2021).
31. Id. at 52–61, 856 S.E.2d at 741–46.
32. Id. at 60–61, 856 S.E.2d at 745–46.
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of Appeals addressed this issue in Forsyth County v. Mommies Properties
LLC.33
In Mommies Properties LLC, Mommies Properties LLC (Mommies)
appealed four decisions to the Forsyth Zoning Board of Appeals (ZBA).
The four appeals included the appeal of a decision to implement a stop
work order, an appeal of a decision requiring an erosion control plan for
grassing the property, an appeal of a second stop work order, and an
appeal of a decision denying Mommies a building permit. On all four
appeals, the ZBA found in favor of Forsyth County (the County). 34
Following the decisions of the ZBA, Mommies appealed to the superior
court, which reversed the four ZBA decisions. Moreover, the superior
court denied the County’s motions for reconsideration in each case. The
County then filed four applications for discretionary appeal, which the
court of appeals granted. In all four claims on appeal, the County
asserted that the trial court erred when it concluded that “all hearsay
evidence presented in front of the ZBA, without objection, was not
competent evidence, and in finding that the evidence could not support
the ZBA’s decision.”35 The court of appeals agreed.36
The superior court noted that its review of the lower court on certiorari
is limited to alleged errors of law and determining whether “any
evidence” supported the ZBA’s decision. The superior court noted that
“‘[t]he factual findings of the [ZBA] are conclusive to the extent that they
are supported by competent evidence,’ and ‘[c]ompetent evidence is that
which is admissible.’” However, the superior court cited a pre-2013 case
that held “hearsay evidence, presented during an administrative
proceeding, is not competent or appropriate evidence.” The court of
appeals held that the superior court’s reliance on this pre-2013 case
conflicted with the new Evidence Code.37
It reasoned that the superior court’s ruling in the 2013 case where “all
hearsay evidence, whether objected to or not, is inadmissible,” clearly
conflicted with the new Evidence Code.38 Under O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802,
“[h]earsay shall not be admissible except as provided by this article;
provided, however, that if a party does not properly object to hearsay, the
objection shall be deemed waived, and the hearsay evidence shall be legal
evidence and admissible.”39 The court of appeals reviewed the ZBA

33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

359 Ga. App. 175, 855 S.E.2d 126 (2021).
Id. at 175–176, 855 S.E.2d at 129.
Id. at 176–184, 855 S.E.2d at 129–34.
Id.
Id. at 184, 855 S.E.2d at 134.
Id.
O.C.G.A. § 24-8-802 (2021).
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hearing in which Mommies appeared pro se.40 At the hearing, Mommies
never objected to the application of the evidentiary rules or the
procedures adopted, and was provided an opportunity to cross examine
the County’s witnesses.41 Because pro se litigants are held to the same
rules of practice and procedures as lawyers and rely on the new Evidence
Code, this court held that the superior court erred by unilaterally
disregarding the unobjected-to hearsay evidence heard before the ZBA.42
Therefore, under the new Evidence Code, unobjected-to hearsay is
admissible.
VI. REDEFINING “SUFFICIENT FACTS AND DATA” UNDER THE NEW
EVIDENCE CODE
In further deviation from Georgia’s prior Evidence Code and to better
align the new Evidence Code with the federal code, the Court of Appeals
of Georgia in Emory University v. Willcox43 expanded the admissibility of
expert opinions by limiting the scope of “sufficient facts and data.” 44
In Willcox, the Administrator of Corlett Evans’s estate alleged that
Evans died as a result of complications of the paraplegia that was
wrongfully caused during a hospitalization. In support of this allegation,
the plaintiff’s expert opined that Evans “would not have died with the
conditions which took her life had she not become paralyzed in June
2015.” Defendants moved to exclude this opinion as it was not based
“upon sufficient facts or data” because the plaintiff’s expert did not
review any of the decedent’s medical records from before the
hospitalization in question. The defendants argued that the prior records
would have shown the decedent’s uncontrolled diabetes could have
contributed to the paralysis and death. In support of his opinion, the
plaintiff’s expert testified that he was generally aware of the decedent’s
pre-existing conditions when he formed his opinion. The trial court
ultimately denied the defendants’ motion to exclude this evidence.45
On appeal, the defendants argued that the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing the testimony to opinions regarding medical
causation that was not based “upon sufficient facts or data” as required
by O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(b).46 Under O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(b), the testimony
of a qualified expert is admissible if: “(1) [it] is based upon sufficient facts
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Mommies Properties LLC, 359 Ga App. at 185, 855 S.E.2d at 134.
Id. at 185–186, 855 S.E.2d at 135.
Id. at 186–188, 855 S.E.2d at 135–137.
355 Ga. App. 542, 844 S.E.2d 889 (2020).
Id. at 542, 844 S.E.2d at 891.
Id. at 542–544, 844 S.E.2d at 891–893.
Id. at 542, 844 S.E.2d at 891.
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or data; (2) [it] is the product of reliable principles and methods; and (3)
the [expert] witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to
the facts of the case.”47
In its opinion, the Court of Appeals of Georgia acknowledged that this
language is “materially identical to both Federal Rule of Evidence 702
and to former O.C.G.A. § 24-9-67.1(b).”48 Accordingly, the court looked
not to former Georgia case law, but to federal case law. 49 The court noted
that the “sufficiency of [an] expert’s basis for opinion is part of [the]
opinion’s ultimate reliability” that presents “a jury question as to the
weight which should be assigned [to] the opinion.” 50 Accordingly, the
court rejected prior Georgia case law that stated “an incomplete medical
history” makes an opinion “inherently unreliable.” 51 Instead, the court of
appeals affirmed the trial court’s admission of the expert testimony based
on the trial court’s broad discretion and the creation of a jury question. 52
VIII. CONCLUSION
As the world faced countless uncertainties, Georgia’s appellate courts
provided at least one area of consistency for litigators in Georgia: when
in doubt, turn to federal case law. Indeed, this Survey period confirms,
as discussed in last year’s Survey, that the new Evidence Code strongly
favors admissibility. In the future, the onus will be on litigators to
actively prevent admission of improper evidence, even where pre-motion
practice would have previously satisfied this duty.

47. O.C.G.A. § 24-7-702(b) (2021).
48. Willcox, 355 Ga App. at 542, 844 S.E.2d at 891.
49. See id.
50. Id. at 545, 844 S.E.2d at 893 (quoting Toyo Tire N. Am. Mfg., Inc. v. Davis, 333 Ga.
App 211, 217, 775 S.E.2d 796, 801 (2015)).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 546, 844 S.E.2d at 894.

